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Abstract
In reality, most voluntary agreements with polluters (VAs) are not enforceable
in the sense that no legal tools are available to enforce rmscommitments. We
examine whether such VAs are able to achieve an e¢ cient level of environmental
protection when they are obtained under the legislative threat of a pollution quota.
We show that they can improve social welfare relative to legislative intervention
when lobbying Congress is very e¤ective and when the polluter and the regulator
do not discount future costs and benets heavily. These ndings suggest that VAs
should be used selectively, taking into account sector characteristics and the degree
of inuence of lobbying on Congress.
Keywords: environmental policy, voluntary agreements, bargaining, lobbying,
enforcement.
JEL classication: D72, Q28
1 Introduction
In environmental policy, a Voluntary Agreement (VA hereafter), whereby polluting
rms voluntarily commit to control pollution, has become a major policy innova-
tion of the last decade. While the use of VAs was limited initially to a few countries
(e.g., Germany, Japan), they are now used extensively around the world, partic-
ularly to deal with industrial greenhouse gas emissions and waste. The use of
the term "voluntary" has long been disputed since many agreements are in fact
obtained under the threat of an alternative legislative intervention. The present
paper focuses on such agreements preempting legislation.
In most countries, VAs are not binding. As a result, no legal tools are available
to enforce rmscommitments. For instance, this is the case in Canada, France,
Germany and the United States. To the best of our knowledge, the only excep-
tions are the UK Climate Change agreements and the Dutch "covenants" which
are made enforceable through their connection with mandatory regulation. A few
countries (e.g., Belgium) have tried to set up a legal framework to promote en-
forceable agreements with varying results essentially because most companies are
reluctant to enter into binding schemes.
Non-enforceability contributes to a widespread suspicion among observers about
VAs ability to genuinely improve the environment. However, this property does
not imply that compliance incentives are completely lacking. The legislative threat
which initiates the voluntary commitment of polluters also promotes compliance
ex post since the parties to the VA contract are all aware that, in case of non-
compliance, the threat will be acted upon. But non-compliance cannot be observed
immediately after the contract comes into force. Furthermore, once it is discov-
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ered, enacting a new legislation takes time. In the end, several years necessarily
elapse before the non-complying polluters bear the cost of the legislation. This
obviously creates adverse incentives. In particular, rms may enter strategically
into voluntary agreements without any willingness to comply, just to postpone
legislative intervention.
In this paper, we develop a model of a non-enforceable agreement between a
polluter and a benevolent regulator to address these issues. We examine whether
this type of VA can lead to an e¢ cient level of pollution abatement and how this
level compares to both the rst-best level and the level that might have been im-
posed legislatively. We make two crucial assumptions. First, the legislative threat
is determined endogenously. More specically, we explicitly model a legislative
process in which the polluter lobbies a Congress, thereby reducing the stringency
of mandated abatement. Otherwise, a benevolent regulator would have absolutely
no reason to use a VA since it could impose the rst-best legislation directly. Sec-
ond, we assume that the regulator can only punish a non-complying polluter by
implementing the threat in the future. In this context, the polluters propensity
to comply is driven by the endogenous stringency of the legislative quota and by
the rate at which he discounts the cost of future legislation.
We do not know of any previous contribution dealing with non-enforceable
VAs1. Some work in this eld has explored the role of legislative threats in trigger-
ing voluntary abatement [4, 9, 10, 14]2. But they all assume perfect compliance.
This obviously inuences the analysis and the results obtained. In particular, pol-
luters do not enter into perfectly enforceable VAs to delay legislative intervention
as in our case.
Amacher and Malik [1] or Arguedas [2] do not specically deal with VAs but
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address related issues. They examine bargaining between a polluter and a regu-
lator over the value of an emission standard. In contrast with the papers on VAs
previously mentioned, they do not assume perfect compliance. But in contrast
with ours, the standard is enforceable, albeit imperfectly. In fact, they deal with
the negotiation taking place during the process of setting traditional mandatory
emission standards. In this context, they analyze a situation in which the regula-
tor is ready to accept a more lenient standard if it leads the polluter to adopt an
abatement technology which reduces enforcement costs. In our setting, the regu-
lators gain is totally di¤erent. It enters into the VA in order to avoid a politically
distorted legislative quota.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of real-world
voluntary agreements. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 identies the
circumstance under which a non-enforceable VA can emerge in equilibrium. The
analysis rests on the key property that entering into a VA is a dominant strategy for
the polluter. Indeed, either the Polluter enters into the VA to postpone legislative
intervention without any intention to abate pollution, or it does so to comply with
its commitments because the discounted cost of the legislation is su¢ ciently high.
Accordingly, Section 5 focuses on the regulators motives to rely on VAs. We show
that the VA is more e¢ cient than legislation in cases where lobbying Congress
is very e¤ective and when polluters and the regulator do not discount the future
heavily. In Section 6, we discuss the robustness of these results and present an
extension of the model in which the Polluter competes with a green lobby group
to inuence the Congress.
In Section 7, we conclude and discuss policy implications, particularly for cli-
mate change policies where VAs are widespread. The key lesson is that non-
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enforceable voluntary schemes are weak instruments that are potentially useful
when political constraints are severe. This is probably the case when regulators
seek to cut carbon emissions of energy-intensive industries.
2 VAs in practice
This section o¤ers an insight into real-world voluntary agreements. It aims to
identify key properties which should be incorporated into a relevant model of VAs.
It rests mainly on case studies of real-world voluntary agreements presented in a
recent OECD report [13] and in the book by Morgenstern and Pizer [11] who deal
more specically with voluntary schemes in the eld of climate change.
In every VA, a rm or a group of rms agree to make environmental e¤orts
beyond regulatory compliance. But the design of these voluntary commitments
varies signicantly. A usual classication distinguishes three broad categories [13].
Each type ultimately di¤ers with respect to the degree of involvement of the regu-
lator. Under public voluntary programs, the rms agree to make abatement e¤orts
to meet goals which are established by the regulator. This is the most common
form of VA in the USA. The 33/50 Program aiming at reducing the release of toxic
substances is a well known example [6]. In the case of a negotiated agreement, the
rms and the regulator jointly devise the commitments through bargaining. This
type of VA is frequently used in Europe. As an illustration, the European Com-
mission secured negotiated agreements during the 1990s with European (ACEA),
Japanese (JAMA) and Korean (KAMA) car manufacturers to reduce new car CO2
emissions.
Under self-regulation or unilateral commitments, the Polluter takes the initia-
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tive. He freely sets up a program of environmental actions without any formal
inuence from public authorities. A good example is the Responsible Care initia-
tive undertaken by the International Council of Chemical Associations which is
run in 52 countries. In section 6, we consider di¤erent allocations of bargaining
power between the regulator and the polluters.
The e¢ ciency of the level of environmental protection achieved by VAs is a
major practical concern. Two features are of particular concern to some observers:
that VAs are voluntary, suggesting little abatement e¤ort, and that VAs are mostly
not enforceable, causing concerns about compliance.
As argued in the introduction, the fact that most agreements are developed in
the face of a threat of regulation3 partly mitigates these concerns. Despite this
threat, the environmental outcomes of actual VAs are arguably modest. According
to the OECD report, "there are only a few cases where such approaches have
been found to contribute to environmental improvements signicantly di¤erent
from what would have happened anyway" [13]. In the book by Morgenstern and
Pizer [11], where 7 climate change VAs are assessed, conclusions are slightly more
optimistic. Most estimates of the environmental e¤ect beyond business-as-usual
are in the 5-10% range.
The modest impact of many VAs suggests that legislative threats are typically
weak. This weakness is due to the existence of political constraints impeding
legislative action. An illuminating example is provided by the climate change VAs
adopted in most EU countries in the mid-nineties. In 1994, just before the adoption
of these VAs, an EU carbon tax project had been withdrawn under the pressure of
lobby groups representing European energy-intensive industries. All parties were
thus aware that legislation was not an easy alternative path. But, the on-going
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discussions at the international level - in which the European Union was playing
a leading role and which led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 - was
also making clear that mandatory intervention would take place if the industry
did not commit to cut emissions of greenhouse gases.
This section has attempted to highlight three key points associated with VAs,
which are developed more fully in the model in the following sections. First, rms
participation in VAs and compliance are frequently driven by legislative threats.
Second, lobbying usually lessens the strictness and the credibility of these threats.4
Finally, most VAs are not enforceable.
3 The model
We depict a policy game with three players: a benevolent Regulator, a rm (which
we call the Polluter) and a Congress responsible for enacting legislation. In the rst
stage, the Regulator and the Polluter negotiate a Voluntary Agreement specifying
a level of pollution abatement B to be met by the Polluter. In case of persisting
disagreement, the Regulator can ask the Congress to enact legislation. What
makes the problem non-trivial is the existence of lobbying in the Congress which
prevents the enactment of the socially e¢ cient mandatory policy. In this context,
the regulator must choose between two evils: either a piece of legislation distorted
by lobbying or a non-enforceable VA.
In reality, certain VAs involve a coalition of polluters represented by an industry
association. In our setting, the Polluter can either be a single rm or an industry.
In the latter case, we assume that the members of the coalition have solved their
collective action problem.
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We now enter into the details of the model. Abating pollution entails a cost
borne by the Polluter which is described by an increasing and convex function
C(B), with C 0(0) < 1 and C(0) = 0: We do not grant any cost advantage to the
VA: abatement costs are the same under the VA and the legislative quota.
Abatement also yields an environmental benet. We assume that this benet
equates with the abatement level B; so that social welfare can be written as
W (B)  B   C(B) (1)
The linearity of the benet function simplies the notations without altering any
results. Under these hypotheses, the abatement level B, which maximizes social
welfare, solves:
C 0(B)  1 (2)
If the Regulator and the Polluter fail to agree, a piece of legislation mandating
a level of abatement L is implemented. In contrast to the VA, we assume that
the Polluter perfectly complies with the quota5. The abatement quota L is the
outcome of a legislative process initiated by the Regulator. This process is subject
to lobbying which is modelled using the approach popularized by Grossman and
Helpman (see [5], chapters 7-8). We assume that the Polluter is the only lobby
group exerting an inuence in the Congress by making campaign contributions to
a median legislator. In section 5, we analyze a variant where the polluter competes
with a green lobby group.
Contributions can be in kind - by working for the legislators, by communicating,
or by convincing citizens - or in cash. The Legislator maximizes his probability
of re-election facing an implicit challenger by maximizing a weighted sum of the
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campaign contributions and social welfare. In fact, the Legislator is imagined as a
democratically elected legislator who, during a term in Congress, collects campaign
contributions he will use in a later, unmodelled, election. In this situation, he
is facing a trade-o¤ between (i) higher campaign contributions that help him to
convince undecided or uninformed voters but at the cost of distorting policy choices
in favor of the contributing group and (ii) a higher social welfare which increases
the probability of re-election, given that voters take their welfare into consideration
in their choice of candidate. Formally, his utility function is
V (L; x) = W (L) + (1  )x; (3)
where L is the legislative quota, x the campaign contribution o¤ered to the
Legislator and  2 [0; 1], the exogenously given weight that the Legislator places
on social welfare relative to the campaign contribution. One can interpret  as
reecting the responsiveness of the Congress to lobbying.
The timing of the legislative subgame is as follows:
1. The Regulator initiates the legislative process by asking Congress to mandate
an abatement quota.
2. The Polluter o¤ers the median Legislator a campaign contribution schedule
x(L) which is contingent on the adopted legislative quota L; this o¤er is
assumed to be binding.
3. Then, the Legislator proposes and raties the quota L and receives from the
Polluter the contribution associated with the policy selected.
Note that, in this political procedure, the Regulator does not set the agenda of
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the Congress. It can not stipulate a particular abatement level to be voted on; in-
stead, it requests that Congress enacts legislation. If the Regulator could stipulate
an abatement level, it would propose the rst-best quota B: Since V (L; x)  0
for any L and x, this quota would be approved by Congress. Thus, the political
distortions described above would be circumvented.
If a VA is adopted, but the Polluter chooses not to comply, we suppose that
the Regulator initiates the legislative process leading to the quota L. As this takes
place in a future period, the Polluter discounts the cost of the sanction. Hence, he
complies only if the cost of meeting the target B is less than the discounted cost
of the sanction:
C(B)   [C(L) + x(L)] (4)
where  is a multiplicative discount factor  2 (0; 1) reecting the Polluters
patience6.
We assume that the Regulator does not observe the Polluters discount factor,
and hence is not perfectly informed about the Polluters propensity to comply with
the VA:
Assumption 1  is a random variable whose realization is only known to the
Polluter when the game begins, but whose distribution is common knowledge. The
distribution of  is uniform over the interval

   ;  +   [0; 1].7
Introducing uncertainty of compliance can be justied on two grounds. First, it
is realistic. The cost of waiting is specic to each Polluter or industry as it depends
on the weight of irreversible investments, the rms nancial structure and similar
idiosyncratic features.8 Second, the assumption is justied on theoretical grounds:
if the Regulator knew , the outcome of the game would entail a corner solution.
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If  exceeded a certain threshold, the Polluter would perfectly comply with the
VA; if  fell below that threshold, the Polluter would not comply at all, and the
Regulator would never use a VA.
Assumption 1 implies that the Regulator only knows the compliance probabil-
ity, denoted p(B); at the beginning of the game. Formally, given the distribution
properties, the probability function is
p(B) = Pr (C(B)   [C(L) + x(L)])
=
8>>>><>>>>:
1; if B  Bmin
1
2

 +    C(B)
C(L)+x(L)

; if Bmin < B < Bmax
0; if B  Bmax
(5)
where Bmin and Bmax denote the abatement levels such that
C(Bmin)       (C(L) + x(L)) ;
C(Bmax)    +  (C(L) + x(L)) :
Finally, we assume that the Regulator also discounts the social benet of future
legislation, using the weight "; which is positive but less than one.
Figure 1 shows the decision tree of the model.
Figure 1 about here
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4 Conditions for the existence of a VA
We begin the analysis by identifying the conditions under which an agreement
between the Polluter and the Regulator is feasible. Note that any feasible agree-
ment necessarily improves social welfare relative to legislation since it satises the
participation constraint of the welfare-maximizing Regulator.
4.1 The legislative subgame
We rst characterize the legislation which emerges in equilibrium. Recall that the
median Legislators utility is V (L; x) = W (L)+(1 )x =  [L  C(L)]+(1 )x.
Any feasible contribution must leave him with at least the same utility under the
policy L as he would achieve with no contribution. Otherwise, he would reject the
o¤er and implement B (his ideal policy when x = 0). Thus, for a contribution to
be feasible, we require V (L; x)  V (B; 0) = [B   C(B)]. The Polluter o¤ers
a contribution that minimizes his disutility, C(L) + x, subject to the feasibility
constraint. Since his disutility is increasing in x, the feasibility constraint will
bind. This contribution is implicitly dened by V (L; x) = V (B; 0). Thus, the
campaign contribution will depend on the quota as follows:
x(L) =

1   [W (B
) W (L)] (6)
In light of eqs (1) and (6), the Polluter minimizes
C(L) + x(L) =
W (B)  L+ C(L)
1   (7)
As the function (7) is convex, there is a unique value L that minimizes the
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Polluters disutility, where C 0(L) = . The Polluter o¤ers the campaign contri-
bution x(L) in exchange for adoption of the quota L. We collect these ndings
in
Lemma 1 The equilibrium legislation L is such that C 0(L) =  while the equi-
librium campaign contribution is x(L) = 
1  [W (B
) W (L)].
Since  < 1, it follows that L < B.
4.2 The VA subgame
We turn next to the analysis of the VA. When negotiating over the level of vol-
untary abatement B, the Polluters utility obviously depends on his compliance
decision. Given the compliance condition (4), his payo¤ is thus given by
max f C(B);  [C(L) + x(L)]g (8)
It follows that entering into a VA is a dominant strategy for the Polluter since
Lemma 2 The Polluters payo¤ under a VA is higher than his legislative payo¤
for any level of voluntary abatement:
Proof. Recall that legislative payo¤ is simply  C(L)   x(L): If C(B) 
 [C(L) + x(L)] ; then  C(B)    [C(L) + x(L)] since  < 1: Alternatively, if
C(B) >  [C(L) + x(L)] ; we obviously have  [C(L) + x(L)] >   [C(L) + x(L)] :
The intuition of the lemma is simple. The Polluter is willing to participate in
any VA because discounting makes the sanction cost  [C(L) + x(L)] strictly less
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than his disagreement disutility C(L)+x(L). As a result, the Polluter enters into
a VA either because it is less costly than legislation (when B is low), or because
he anticipates non-compliance (when B is higher).
This property greatly simplies the analysis: non-enforceable VAs are only
driven by the preferences of the Regulator.
We now dene the Regulators payo¤ under the VA route:
W V A(B)  p(B)W (B) + [1  p(B)] "W (L) (9)
where " is the rate at which it discounts the social benet of future legislation in
case of non-compliance. Note that, as is usual in the political economy literature,
we assume that the Regulator does not care about the campaign contribution as it
is a transfer between the Polluter and the Congress. The alternative assumption
that the contribution is a cost included in the welfare function would not reverse
the results. It would simply make a VA more likely by creating an additional
incentive for the Regulator to use this instrument.
Assumption 1 introduces (one-sided) asymmetric information in the game. In
this case, bargaining theory tells us that satisfying players participation con-
straints may not be su¢ cient to ensure the existence of ex post e¢ cient bargaining
outcomes when payo¤s are correlated (see [12] for a general discussion)9. Intu-
itively, this is so because the informed player has an incentive to manipulate the
information he transmits to the uninformed player. More precisely, he has an
incentive to pretend he will comply with the VA. As the Regulator is aware of
this incentive to lie, the minimal level of abatement it might be willing to accept
may be strictly higher than the reservation level of the high typePolluter who
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complies with the VA. However, this general argument does not apply to our case
since the Regulator is aware that the polluter is willing to accept any VA (see
Lemma 2): We establish the argument more rigorously in
Lemma 3 If there exists a level of abatement B such thatW V A(B) > W (L), then
there exists a bargaining procedure such that bargaining yields an ex-post e¢ cient
Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following bargaining procedure. The Polluter makes an o¤er
to the Regulator. If the o¤er is accepted, the agreement is struck and the game
ends. But if the Regulator rejects the o¤er, then the game ends with no agreement.
Letting ~B() denoting the Polluters o¤er when his type is ; the following set of
strategies is a Bayes Nash equilibrium: 8 2    ;  + , ~B() = B such that
W V A(B) =W (L); and the Regulator accepts the o¤er. The outcome is obviously
Pareto e¢ cient, because any deviation from B makes one player worse o¤. This
bargaining procedure allocates all the bargaining power to the Polluter. Under the
hypothesis that the Regulator has the bargaining power, it would make an o¤er
maximizing her payo¤ which will also be accepted since the Polluter agrees in
every case.
5 Regulators bargaining payo¤
5.1 General properties
Lemma 3 tells us that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of
a VA is the existence of an abatement level B such that W V A(B) > W (L), or
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alternatively
max

W V A(B) : B  0	 > W (L); (10)
the highest VA welfare must exceed the equilibrium legislative welfare. In this
section, we investigate the properties ofW V A in order to identify the circumstances
under which condition (10) is satised.
Combining (5) and (9) yields
W V A(B) =
8>>>><>>>>:
W (B) if B  Bmin
F (B) if Bmin < B < Bmax
"W (L) if B  Bmax
where
F (B)  1
2

 +    C(B)
C(L) + x(L)

[W (B)  "W (L)] + "W (L); (11)
Then, we establish a set of properties of F which will be used to representW V A
diagrammatically.
Lemma 4 We have:
1) F 0(0) > W 0(0):
2) F (0) = 0:
3) If W (Bmax) < "W (L); then F 0 > 0 for any B 2 Bmin; Bmax :
4) If W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin) > 0; then F admits a unique interior
maximum, denoted B^; over

Bmin; Bmax

.
5) If W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin)  0; then F 0  0 for any B 2
Bmin; Bmax

.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Using these properties, Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c show W V A as a function of B
in the di¤erent cases: In all cases, W V A(B) equals W (B) when B  Bmin (since
p(B) = 1) and "W (L) when B  Bmax. Between Bmin and Bmax, W V A is either
strictly decreasing (Fig. 2a), non-monotonic (Fig. 2b) or strictly increasing (Fig.
2c).
Figure 2a about here
Figure 2b here
Figure 2c about here
Looking at Fig. 2a-c, it is evident that the highest level of VA social welfare is
given by
max

W V A(B) : B  0	 =
8>>>><>>>>:
W (Bmin) if W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin)  0
F (B^) if W (Bmax)  "W (L)and F 0(Bmin) > 0
"W (L) if W (Bmax) < "W (L)
Hence,
Proposition 1 1) If W (Bmax)  "W (L); a welfare-improving VA exists if either
a) F 0(Bmin)  0 and Bmin > L or b) F 0(Bmin) > 0 and F (B^) > W (L):
2) If W (Bmax) < "W (L); there never exists a VA yielding a higher welfare
than the legislative quota.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward since we know max

W V A(B) : B  0	 in
the di¤erent cases. In the particular case where W (Bmax) < "W (L), no VAs are
feasible since max

W V A
	
= "W (L) which is strictly less than W (L) (since
" < 1):
Proposition 1 is the main proposition of the paper. It establishes that, de-
pending on parametersvalues, we can either observe a VA or not. In addition, a
VA may involve a risk of non-compliance or not. For instance, assuming that the
Regulator has all the bargaining power, it selects the abatement level B^ maximiz-
ing W V A when W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin) > 0. And we know from (5)
that p(B^) < 1. Alternatively, if F 0(Bmin)  0; the Regulator chooses Bmin with a
compliance probability equal to 1:
5.2 Interpretation of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 does not allow us to see how the di¤erent parameters inuence the
likelihood of a VAs existence. For instance, the condition Bmin > L does not
necessarily imply that  should be less than a certain level to obtain a VA since
both L and Bmin increase with . To further the interpretation of the model,
we now investigate the properties of the equilibrium when abatement costs are
quadratic, with C(B) = 1
2
B2; where  > 0.10
Calculations included in the appendix characterize the key relationships be-
tween the conditions of Proposition 1 and the parameters ; ; and ": They show
that
Proposition 2 The VA outcome is closer to the rst-best one than the legislative
quota when the Congress is strongly responsive to lobbying (a low ) and when the
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Polluter and the Regulator are patient (high  and ").
The inuence of the lobbying parameter  is not so intuitive as a high re-
sponsiveness to lobbying a¤ects VA welfare in two contradictory ways. On the
one hand, it reduces the stringency of the legislative quota L, thereby increasing
the Regulators interest in VAs. On the other hand, it increases the risk of non-
compliance associated with VAs since the size of the sanction  (C(L) + x(L))
directly depends on the strictness of the quota. Proposition 2 tells us that the
former e¤ect unambiguously outweighs the latter.
The result that the more patient the Polluter, the larger the scope for welfare-
improving VAs is not surprising as a low discount rate mitigates the VA compliance
problem by increasing the size of the sanction  (C(L) + x(L)) borne by the
Polluter. The reason for a patient Regulators tendency to prefer VAs is also simple.
Key in explaining this is the way the Regulator values non-compliance: In the
case where the Polluter fails to comply, the Regulators utility is "W (L) which
corresponds to the delayed implementation of the legislative quota. This benet
obviously increases with "; making the use of VAs more attractive.
6 Robustness of the results
The model presented here is fairly simplistic. It is worth discussing the robustness
of the insights it gives and some possible extensions. Three criticisms/questions
come quickly to mind: the impact of bargaining power on outcomes, the fact
that there is no green lobby group acting in the Congress and the assumption
that polluters have solved their collective action problem. We now consider these
points.
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6.1 Bargaining power
When interpreting Proposition 1 in subsection 5.2, we assume that the Regulator
has all the bargaining power. How do di¤erent allocations of bargaining power
inuence the results obtained? This question echoes the classication previously
mentioned which distinguishes three categories of VAs: public voluntary programs
developed by public authorities, to which companies are invited to participate,
negotiated agreements between polluters and public authorities, and unilateral
commitments made by polluters. In settings, like ours, where VAs are driven by
Regulators threats, this classication ultimately describes di¤erent allocations of
bargaining power between the regulator and the polluters.11
Given that the Regulator seeks to maximize welfare, it is very intuitive that
Proposition 3 Social welfare associated with a non-enforceable VA increases with
the Regulators bargaining power.
Proof. See the appendix.
6.2 Lobbying by a green group and free riding
The fact that the Polluter is the only active lobby group in the Congress and that
free riding does not hinder its lobbying e¤orts may pose a problem as one could
expect better legislative outcomes once these assumptions are relaxed.
In this subsection, we adopt a common agency framework in which the Legis-
lator is the agent of two principals - the Polluter and a green lobby group - both
o¤ering contributions. For the sake of tractability, we only consider VAs involving
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perfect compliance in equilibrium (p(BV A) = 1) and we assume that the Regulator
has all the bargaining power. Formally, the Legislators utility function is now
V (L; x) = W (L) + (1  ) (xP (L) + xG(L)) ; (12)
where xP (L) and xG(L) are the Polluters and the green groups contingent con-
tribution schedules, respectively.
We also introduce free riding considerations, admittedly roughly, by assuming
that the Polluters lobbying cost is xP (L)=(1 ) for making a contribution xP (L)
to the median legislator with 0   < 1.  is a new parameter capturing the idea
that, when some rms within an industry fail to cooperate, remaining contribu-
tors should make additional e¤orts. Note that  is inversely related to lobbying
e¤ectiveness. Under this assumption, Polluters legislative pay o¤ is now
 C(L)  xP (L)
1  
Turning next to the green lobby group, we suppose that it is only concerned
with the environmental benet of legislation so that its utility under legislation is
L  xG(L)
1  
with 0   < 1: Note that, when  > , the green group is less e¤ective in lobbying
activities than the Polluter.
The derivation of the political equilibrium closely follows Grossman and Help-
man [5] and is left out for ease of presentation. When the lobby groups choose
their contributions, the key di¤erence from the previous sections is that "walk-
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ing away" no longer implies that the Legislator will implement the optimal quota
B: Rather, if a group abstains from lobbying, the Legislator implements the best
legislation given the other groups contribution.
In addition, we assume that contributions schedules are globally compensating.
This means that each contribution function "compensates" the group for its di¤er-
ent evaluations of the two policy options. Accordingly, the contribution functions
are given by
xP (L)
1   = C(L
 P )  C(L) and xG(L)
1   = L  L
 G (13)
where L P and L G denote the legislative quotas when the Polluter or the green
group are not involved, respectively. This assumption is routinely made in the
literature because it is necessary to pin down equilibrium contributions (for de-
tailed explanations and justications, see [5], pp 265-270)12. Plugging (13) in the
Legislators objective function (12) and omitting constant terms, we obtain the
following maximization problem
max
L
W (L) + (1  ) [(1  )L  (1  )C(L)]
We derive the rst-order condition and solve for L so that equilibrium legislation
is
L =
1


1   (1  )
1   (1  )

(14)
Note that the quota (14) coincides with the rst-best quota (B) when lobby
groups are equally e¤ective ( = ): This obviously implies that
Proposition 4 When groups are equally e¤ective in lobbying activities ( = );
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VAs never dominate legislative intervention in equilibrium since the legislative
quota is socially optimal.
This proposition illustrates a general feature of contribution-based lobbying
games. Distortions are driven by the existence of a political asymmetry between
the groups a¤ected by the policy, either because lobby groups are not equally
e¤ective ( 6= ) or because one group is not represented in the lobbying game like
in the previous sections.
By contrast, if lobbying e¤ectiveness is heterogeneous, calculations provided in
the appendix show that
Proposition 5 When  6= ; a VA yields a higher welfare than legislation when
the lobbying parameter  is low, when the Polluter is patient (a high ), when the
Polluters lobbying e¤ectiveness is low (as reected by a high ), or when the green
groups lobbying e¤ectiveness is high (as reected by a small ).
If  is su¢ ciently low - that is, if  < (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

- the
VA even yields the rst-best abatement level B:
Proof. See the appendix.
The rst part of Proposition 5 is in line with previous results (the impact
of  and ). The inuence of lobbying e¤ectivenessparameters  and  is less
intuitive. And the fact that voluntary abatement can be socially optimal when 
is su¢ ciently low is clearly a new and striking result. In order to understand the
underlying intuition of these results, recall that the Regulatorability to implement
a strict VA is constrained by the compliance condition
C(B) < 

C(L) +
xP (L
)
1  

(15)
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This expression makes clear that the higher the value of , the wider the room
for a strict VA with which the Polluter will comply. The reason is extremely
simple. As compared to the preceding sections in which  was set to zero, our
new assumption increases the Polluters lobbying cost xP (L)=(1 ) and thus the
scope for VAs by increasing the size of compliance incentives.
Now, let us substitute (13) in (15). The compliance condition becomes
C(B) < C(L P )
It is then clear that the room for a strict VA increases with L P . And L P is
high when the green lobby is very e¤ective (a small ) or when the Legislator
is strongly responsive to lobbying (a low ). If L P is su¢ ciently high, we can
perfectly observe a VA involving B. This occurs when C(B) < C(L P ) as we
observe perfect compliance with BV A = B:
Therefore, this extension does not change the general message that VAs are
suitable in contexts in which the responsiveness of the Congress to lobbying is
high. But, in addition to this, it shows that the introduction of competition with
a green lobby group or a decrease in the Polluters lobbying e¤ectiveness (by setting
 6= 0) tend to increase the scope for VAs by raising the Polluters lobbying cost
and thus his propensity to comply.
However, note that the robustness of the particular result that the VA can
be socially optimal is questionable. In fact, the size of the left hand side of (15)
directly depends on the assumption that the Polluters contribution schedule is
globally compensating. This assumption, though a usual and a necessary tool to
derive equilibrium contributions, clearly determines a high level of contribution
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since it essentially means that the Legislator is able to extract the entire lobbying
surplus from the two groups.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a model of non-enforceable VAs under the threat of a legislative
quota with two main assumptions. The rst is that the Polluter is an active lobby
group in the Congress inuencing the legislative process. This political distortion
makes possible the entry of the Regulator into a VA which avoids the enactment
of a piece of politically distorted legislation. The fact that the VA contract is
non-binding is the second key assumption. As a result, the Regulator can only
punish a non-complying Polluter by implementing the legislation at a later stage.
We show that a non-enforceable VA can be a better instrument than a legisla-
tive quota in specic circumstances. This is particularly the case when lobbying
exerts a strong inuence on the Congress. Interestingly, the result is not very
intuitive because a distorted legislative process yields two opposite e¤ects. On the
one hand, it obviously reduces the strictness of the legislative quota. On the other
hand, it damages VA social welfare since a lax legislative quota provides lower
compliance incentives. Our analysis shows that the former e¤ect is stronger that
the latter.
This nding contradicts the recurrent policy recommendation that VAs should
be developed under credible legislative or regulatory threats (for instance, see
[13]). When threats are credible and su¢ ciently strong, we show that legislation is
preferable. VAs are also shown to yield a higher social welfare than legislative quo-
tas when the polluter and the regulator do not discount future costs and benets
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heavily.
To conclude, the main nding of the paper is that non-binding VAs are weak
instruments which are potentially useful in adverse political contexts. In practice,
they are particularly widespread in climate change policies. Do our results suggest
that VAs are suitable for these policies? To a large extent, answering this question
is speculative as political contexts vary greatly across countries and the key para-
meters of the model (e.g., ) are not quantiable in a consistent and comparable
way.
Nevertheless, our model pinpoints two arguments in favor of climate change
VAs. First, they have mostly been developed in energy-intensive industries (steel,
glass, cement, chemicals, etc.) which are typically very e¤ective in lobbying activ-
ities. One reason being that free riding is less likely in sectors where companies
are few and large and in which energy (and thus abatement) costs represent a
signicant share of production costs. Second, climate change is a long term policy
concern for which immediate action is less crucial than mid- or long-term policy
strategies. As a result, the regulators cost of waiting is probably low in com-
parison with other policy areas. This promotes the adoption of VAs since a key
risk associated with their use is to delay legislative intervention in the event of
non-compliance.
Our model is quite simplistic and several extensions or improvements could be
pursued. In our view, the two most promising lines of research are the following.
First, one should try to be more specic as to the type of VAs analyzed.13 In this
regard, it would be interesting to investigate specically the case of industry-wide
agreement while relaxing the assumption that rms fully overcome their free-rider
di¢ culties. Second, the hypothesis of perfect information about abatement cost
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should be relaxed. This would probably reduce the scope for VAs since information
asymmetry is particularly detrimental in bargaining contexts.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Lemma 4
To begin with, we di¤erentiate F which leads to
F 0(B) =  C 0(B)= ((2) (C(L) + x(L))) [W (B)  "W (L)] + p(B)W 0(B) (16)
Then we consider the di¤erent properties in turn.
1) We have F 0(0) = 1

[C 0(0)=C(L) + x(L)] "W (L)+

+
2

(1 C 0(0)): From
W 0(0) = 1 C 0(0) follows F 0(0) = 1

[C 0(0)=C(L) + x(L)] "W (L)+

+
2

W 0(0)
which is higher thanW 0(0) since 1

[C 0(0)=C(L) + x(L)] "W (L) > 0 and
 
 + 

=2 
1 (since    by hypothesis).
2) Given (11), F (0) = 0 is obvious.
3) IfW (Bmax) < "W (L); thenW (B) "W (L) < 0 for any B 2 Bmin; Bmax :
Therefore, the rst term of (16) is positive in the same interval. The second term
is also positive since W 0 > 0 when B < B. Hence F 0 > 0.
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4) If W (Bmax)  "W (L); then F is concave for any B 2 Bmin; Bmax since
F"(B) =   1
2
[C"(B)=C(L) + x(L)] [W (B)  "W (L)]
  1

[C 0(B)= (C(L) + x(L))]W 0(B)  p(B)C"(B)
which is obviously negative (since C 0(B); C"(B) and W 0(B) > 0): In addition,
F 0(Bmax) =  C 0(Bmax)= ((2) (C(L) + x(L))) [W (Bmax)  "W (L)] < 0
It implies that there exists a unique interior maximum dened by the rst order
condition F 0(B^) = 0 for any B 2 Bmin; Bmax if F 0(Bmin) > 0 while:
5) F 0(B)  0 if F 0(Bmin)  0:
9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We interpret rst Part 1) of Proposition 1 where W (Bmax)  "W (L). Then, we
consider Part 2) where W (Bmax) < "W (L):
9.2.1 Case 1: W (Bmax)  "W (L)
In this case, Proposition 1 tells us that a welfare-improving VA exists if either a)
F 0(Bmin)  0 and Bmin > L or b) F 0(Bmin) > 0 and F (B^) > W (L): Moreover,
assuming that the Regulator has all the bargaining power, the equilibrium VA is
BV A = Bmin if F 0(Bmin)  0 and BV A = B^ if F 0(Bmin) > 0: We now examine the
inuence of the parameters ; ";  on these results by distinguishing two subcases
L < Bmin and L  Bmin.
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Subcase a: L < Bmin: In this case, Proposition 1 already tells us that VAs
dominate legislation if F 0(Bmin)  0: Here, we show that the same is true when
F 0(Bmin) > 0: For ease of presentation, let L^ denote the value of L implicitly
dened by the two conditions W

L^

= F

B^

and L^ < B^. Using this notation,
F (B^) > W (L) is the same as L < L^: Diagrammatically, Fig. 2b immediately
shows that Bmin < B^: Hence, L < Bmin necessarily implies that L < L^: Note
that L < Bmin is equivalent to  <    .
Subcase b: L  Bmin: In this case, the only feasible agreement is BV A = B^
which is observed when F 0(Bmin) > 0 and F (B^) > W (L): Let g(; "; ) the
function such that g(; "; ) = F (B^) W (L). We now study the properties of g
to identify how ; "; and  inuence its sign.
It is convenient to develop g(; "; ) as follows
g(; "; ) = p(B^)
h
W (B^)  "W (L)
i
  (1  ")W (L) (17)
Di¤erentiating (17) with respect to " and , substituting F 0(B^) = 0 and rearrang-
ing yields
@g
@"
=
h
1  p(B^)
i
W (L)
@g
@
=
1
2
h
W (B^)  "W (L)
i
Both derivatives are positive, meaning that rising " and/or  promotes the exis-
tence of welfare-improving VAs.
Turning next to the parameter ; note that L  Bmin is equivalent to  2
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
   ; 1 : In the particular case where L = Bmin, or  =    ; g > 0 since B^ >
Bmin By contrast, if  = 1, or L = B; we have g(1; "; ) = F (B^) W (B) < 0.
In between these two values of L; simulations available upon request conrm that
g is positive for small values of  and then becomes positive beyond a certain
threshold.
9.2.2 Case 2: W (Bmax) < "W (L)
In this case, the legislative quota Pareto dominates the VA . Here, we establish
that, if ; "; and  are such that W (Bmax) < "W (L); this implies that L >
max
n
Bmin; L^
o
: Put di¤erently, the condition W (Bmax) < "W (L) is not binding
and the properties of ; "; and  identied in Case 1 are su¢ cient to dene the
scope for a welfare-improving agreement.
FromW (Bmax) < "W (L) follows Bmax < L since " < 1. This directly implies
L > Bmin: Fig. 2b also shows that W (Bmax) > F (B^): This implies that L > L^;
or alternatively W (L) > F (B^), since W (Bmax) < "W (L) < W (L):
9.2.3 Summary
According to subcase 1a, there exists a welfare-improving VA if  and  are such
that  <   : If   + ; the analysis of subcase 1b tells us that we have a VA
if  is not too high and/or if  and " are su¢ ciently high. Finally, the condition
of Case 2 is not binding. These elements converge to establish that VAs emerge
when  is low and/or when  and " are high.
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9.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We obviously restrict the analysis to the case where a VA is feasible, that is when
W V A(Bmax)  "W (L). When the Regulator has all the bargaining power, we have
seen that BV A = max
n
Bmin; B^
o
which maximizes expected welfare. Now we show
that BV A = L in the opposite case in which the Polluter has all the bargaining
power. Given (8), his rst-best VA is simply BV A = 0: But this does not satisfy
the Regulators participation constraint W V A(BV A)  W (L): Therefore, this
condition is binding in equilibrium, that is W V A(BV A) = W (L). Figures 2b and
2c then show that this equation admits two roots: L and the abatement level
denoted L0 such that W V A(BV A) = W (L0) and L0 > max
n
Bmin; B^
o
: Ideally, the
Polluter would choose the abatement level maximizing his payo¤, that is either
L0 if he does not comply when BV A = L0 or L if he does. But, the Polluter
cannot select L0 because, in doing so, he reveals to the Regulator that he will
not comply. Hence BV A = L in equilibrium. Under intermediate allocations of
bargaining power, BV A lies in between L and max
n
Bmin; B^
o
and the stronger
the Regulators bargaining power, the closer BV A to the second best optimum
max
n
Bmin; B^
o
:
9.4 Proof of Proposition 5
We rst identify the highest level of abatement Bmin below which the Polluter
complies with the VA. It is implicitly dened by
p(Bmin) =
1
2

 +    C(B
min)
C(L) + xP (L)= (1  )

= 1
30
Substituting xP (L)= (1  ) = C(L P )  C(L) in this equation and rearranging
yields
C(Bmin) =
 
   C(L P ) (18)
L P is the equilibrium of the single-lobby game in which the contribution
xG(L) is still given by (6) while the green group maximizes L   xG(L): Deriving
the rst order condition immediately yields L P = (1   (1  )) =. Plugging
this expression in (18) and solving for Bmin leads to
Bmin =
1

p
   

1 +
1  

(1  )

(19)
Establishing the second part of the proposition is now straightforward. The con-
dition   (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

is simply equivalent to Bmin  B. In
this case, we obviously have p(B) = 1: Hence, the Regulator select BV A = B
without any risk of non-compliance.
If  > (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

; the equilibrium VA involving perfect
compliance is BV A = Bmin and we should investigate when W (Bmin) > W (L). It
is convenient to analyze separately the case where the Polluter is more e¤ective in
the lobbying game ( < ) and where he is not ( > ):
9.4.1 Case 1:  < 
Given (14),  <  implies that L < B: As W is strictly increasing below B; the
condition W (Bmin) > W (L) is the same as Bmin > L. Given (14) and (19), this
writes  < (1  )
p
   =(1  
p
   ): Note that this condition is compatible
with  > (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

since  < :
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Moreover (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

is increasing with both
p
    and
:
9.4.2 Case 2:   
Contrary to Case 1, W is no longer monotonic between Bmin and L, implying
that the condition W (Bmin) > W (L) does not simplify to Bmin > L: As W
is single-peaked, W (Bmin) > W (L) is now equivalent to Bmin > L0 where L0 is
dened by W (L0) =W (L) and L0 < B.
Let us rst identify L0: Developing W (L0) = W (Bmin) and rearranging, we
obtain
L0   1
2
 (L0)2   L + 1
2
 (L)2
which is a polynomial of degree 2. Solving for L0, the two roots are (2=)  L
and L: From L0 < B obviously follows that L0 = (2=)  L:
As a result, Bmin > L0 is equivalent to Bmin > (2=)   L: Substituting (14)
and (19) in this inequality and rearranging leads to
 2 (   +  (1  d))+ (   +  (1  d) + d  2d  1)+d (1  ) (1  ) > 0
where d 
p
   : For ease of presentation, we rewrite this inequality as
follows
 a2    (b  a) + c > 0 (20)
where a   + (1  d) ; b  1 d ( (1  ) + ) and c  d (1  ) (1  ) :Note
that a; b; c  0: It is obvious for a and c since  >  and ; ; d  1: As regards b;
note that it is decreasing with d since  (1  ) +  is positive. Then, substituting
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d = 1 in b yields the expression 1   (1  ) which is positive. This proves that b
is positive for any parameters.
We now solve (20) for : The determinant writes
 = (b  a)2 + 4ac
which is obviously positive. As a result, it admits two roots
1 =
q
(b  a)2 + 4ac  (b  a)
2a
2 =
 
q
(b  a)2 + 4ac  (b  a)
2a
2 is not a feasible solution since 2 < 0: By contrast 1 > 0. But we need to
check whether 1  1: Substituting b = 1  d ( (1  ) + ), c = d (1  ) (1  ),
d =
p
    and rearranging yields 1 
p
     0 which is satised.
The left-hand side of (20) is positive when  = 0; meaning that W (Bmin) >
W (L) when  < 1: Finally, simulations available upon request show that  < 1
is compatible with   (1  )
p
   =

1  
p
   

.
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Notes
1A comprehensive discussion of the literature on VAs is available in Lyon and
Maxwell [1].
2A few papers have analyzed VAs obtained in exchange of a subsidy (see for
instance [7]) or VAs driven by demand considerations [3].
3Some VAs are proposed in the absence of legislative threats. For instance,
U.S. climate change programs such as Climate Wise are used by EPA whereas
the agency had no statutory authority to take formal regulatory actions in this
eld. In these cases, companies join public voluntary agreements in order to obtain
technical assistance and/or favorable publicity from the government ([13], p 1457).
Our paper does not deal with such agreements.
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4Put di¤erently, VAs are used in contexts where mandatory intervention is
di¢ cult. This is very intuitive. Why would public authorities rely on voluntary
actions by polluters if legislation was easy to pass?
5Imperfect compliance with mandatory standards is sometimes observed in re-
ality. However, such standards are at least enforceable in contrast with most VAs.
Our assumption makes this di¤erence very clear-cut.
6In (4), x(L) is discounted in line with the idea that discovering non-compliance
and launching a legislative process takes time. One may rightly argue that the
lobby group contributes before legislation is enacted. This could justify the intro-
duction of a specic discount factor for x(L). This alternative assumption would
not alter the results qualitatively. It would simply modify the composition of the
sanction cost, by giving more weight to x(L) than to C(L):
7The uniformity of the distribution simplies the presentation of the results.
The results will be valid with other distributions, assuming the cumulative and
density are positive and increasing on the whole interval.
8Note that, when the VA involves a sector, discount rates may di¤er across
rms. We assume here that rms have solved their collective action problem. This
implies that, inter alia, they have reached a consensus on a collective discount rate.
9A bargaining outcome is said to be ex post e¢ cient if and only if after all
the information is revealed the players payo¤s associated with the bargaining
outcome are Pareto-e¢ cient. Payo¤s are said to be correlated when the piece of
private information (here ) a¤ects both playerspayo¤s.
10Under this assumption, L = =, Bmin = (1=)
p
(   ); Bmax = (1=)
p
( + )
and the compliance probability of Eq.(7) is 1
2

 +    (B)2


for anyB 2 Bmin; Bmax.
11Common to all types is the fact that the participation constraints of the pol-
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luter and of the regulator are jointly satised. This is so even for self regulation
where the Regulator is seemingly absent. It necessarily agrees with the unilateral
voluntary commitment, albeit implicitly, because, otherwise, it would implement
the threat.
12If one does not need to compute equilibrium contributions, assuming di¤eren-
tiability of contribution functions is su¢ cient to derive the political equilibrium.
Di¤erentiability implies that contributions are locally compensating in equilibrium.
13As done by Lyon and Maxwell [13] for instance.
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Implement B The regulator initiates
the legislative process
The polluter
selects x
The Congress
enacts a quota L
The polluter
does not comply
The polluter
complies
The regulator initiates
the legislative process
The polluter
selects x
The Congress
enacts a quota L
Regulator-polluter
bargaining
Agree Disagree
Figure 1: Decision tree of the VA policy game
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BB
max
B
min
B*
W
B
WVA
eW(L*)
Figure 2a: W V A (in bold) and W if W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin)  0
BB
maxB
min
B*B
W
WVA
eW(L*)
Figure 2b: W V A (in bold) and W if W (Bmax)  "W (L) and F 0(Bmin) > 0
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WVA
W
B
min B
max
B* B
eW(L*)
Figure 2c: W V A (in bold) and W if W (Bmax) < "W (L)
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